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Pre-Going Private Ownership around the World 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
Going private transactions are often highly leveraged, and give rise to potential agency conflicts 
among existing shareholders.  But who exactly are those shareholders, and under what legal 
conditions are these transaction more likely to occur?  We examine ownership structure prior to 
going private transactions in 33 countries around the world from 2002 to 2014.The data indicate 
strong and consistent evidence that pre-going private ownership is characterized by higher 
institutional and corporate ownership. Family ownership lowers the probability of a public to 
private transaction.  Stronger creditor rights increase the probability of going private particularly 
for whole company and institutional buyouts. 
 
Keywords:  Ownership; Law and finance; Public to private transactions 
JEL Classification:  G2, G21, K22 
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I. Introduction 
Public to private buyout transactions (hereafter “going-private” or “buyout” transactions1) 
have grown in popularity around the world. For example, the Carlyle Group, one of the world’s 
largest and most successful private equity organizations, highlighted in their 2013 Q2 Results: 
“We have been active in Asia, recently closing one and announcing another public to private 
transaction in China.” Although, buyouts are supposed to create value by improving target firm 
efficiency (Guo, et al. 2011; Goergen et al., 2014a,b; Brewster et al., 2017), at different points in 
time, buyout transactions have been criticized in the media and have even been banned in some 
countries such as Italy. There has been growing concern in the media around the world that buyouts 
should be regulated. In 2006, for example, The NY Times reported that “LBOs should be illegal”.2 
In 2007, The Economist stated that private equity funds need regulation.3 German governmental 
officials have characterized private equity firms as “locusts”.4 Yet, an active buyout market for 
corporate control also serves a role of external corporate governance, and its aim is to improve 
efficiency. Introducing regulation might distort the governance role of the buyout funds as external 
monitors.  
Although going private transactions have been widely studied in different countries 
(DeAngelo et al., 1984; Lehn and Poulsen, 1989; Halpern et al., 1999; Renneboog and 
Vensteenkiske, 2017), and ownership structures vary widely in different countries (Faccio and 
Lang, 2002), there is scant work that examines ownership structure and shareholder rights prior to 
going private in an international setting, apart from the continental European evidence of 
Achleitner et al. (2013). The worldwide growth in buyout funds taking firms private gives rise to 
question about whether there are differences in the ownership structure of firms prior to going 
private in different countries. Ownership naturally affects internal and external corporate 
governance.  Different types of owners have different incentives in terms of how they affect a 
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firm’s corporate policies (Connelly, et al. 2010; Anderson, et al. 2012; Coffee and Palia, 2016; 
McCahery and Vermeulen, 2016; Wood and Brewster, 2016), how efficiently they run the 
company, and also how they make decisions on whether to sell off the firm.  
Given that buyout funds seek to improve a firm’s efficiency, we claim that firms with 
certain ownership structure might be more likely to be taken private. Also, the way they are taken 
private might differ, as well. In order to assess the validity of these claims, it is helpful to 
understand whether or not shareholder ownership is systematically different before going private. 
Are public to private transactions more common for firms with block ownership? Do they differ 
depending on the buyout type?  
Furthermore, a buyout typically involves leveraging the target company to a significant 
extent. The leverage creates an agency conflict between the investors in the target firm and its 
debtholders (Sherwin, 1988). When the target firm is restructured and left with sufficient funds to 
pay back its debt, it does not harm the creditors. However, the protection of creditors’ rights 
becomes critical when the target firm is left insolvent or without necessary funds in order to sustain 
its operations. 
Bankruptcy risk and expected agency costs are more relevant in the case of whole firm 
institutional buyouts than buildup strategies where the transaction was completed in several stages. 
Stronger creditor rights clarify and strengthen the lender’s legal remedies, and, therefore, increase 
the supply of capital for institutional buyouts.  In the absence of strong creditor rights, it could be 
harder to secure the requisite amount of debt finance, and build-up strategies may be more likely 
due to financial constraints. Also, in the case of management buyouts, information asymmetries 
for the new management team are less pronounced (Howorth et al., 2004), which mitigates the 
need to have stronger creditor rights to bring about completed deals.  
  
5 
 
We also examine whether legal conditions mitigate the probability of going private 
transactions. Better legal conditions ensure stronger certainty about the quality of exchanges and 
trading, thereby improving liquidity and lowering the cost of equity capital for publicly traded 
firms.  As such, better legal conditions increase the likelihood of a firm being public and reduce 
the likelihood of a going private transaction. 
Another concern about going private transactions is the possibility that they may lead to 
potential expropriation of minority shareholders through non-arms-length transactions. Going 
private imposes two primary costs for minority shareholders: lack of liquidity, and lack of 
transparency. In effect, a going private transaction potentially enables majority shareholders to 
extract greater rents from minority shareholders (DeAngelo, et al. 1984). Such misappropriation 
may happen even in developed countries, such as Canada and the U.S.5 While the legal system in 
developed countries affords protections to shareholders in ways that mitigates the likelihood of 
such activity and provides redress in the event that it occurs, there is much more scope for 
opportunistic behavior in countries that do not afford such protections to minority shareholders. 
We, therefore, study whether there are any systematic differences in terms of country 
characteristics before going private transaction.  
We examine these issues with a sample of 778 going private transactions between 2002 
and 2014 from 33 countries, including Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Honk Kong, Hungary, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, the 
Republic of Korea, Lithuania, Malaysia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, 
Poland, Portugal, the Russian Federation, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States of America. 
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We find that going private transactions are more likely if the firm is owned by institutional 
or corporate investors and less likely if it is owned by family. The data show strong and consistent 
evidence that pre-going private ownership is characterized by block corporate or institutional 
investor ownership, where block ownership is defined as a shareholder with 10% stake in the 
company in the year prior to going private. We find that going private through a buildup strategy 
is less likely if the firm is owned by family, while management buyouts are more likely when the 
firm is owned by a corporate investor.  
Stronger creditor rights increase the probability of going private, especially in the case of 
whole company and institutional buyouts. We also find that the legal conditions decrease the 
likelihood of going private for those buyout types. While the results might be affected by potential 
endogeneity problems, we try to mitigate these by running several robustness tests and find largely 
consistent evidence.  
We contribute to the management literature by analyzing ownership differences in public 
to private transactions in an international context. Our paper focuses on ownership differences and 
provides evidence from a multi-country setting to understand the association between law, 
institutions, and ownership on the probability of public to private buyouts. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section II summarizes the hypotheses. The data are 
introduced in Section III. The summary statistics and univariate tests are discussed in Section IV. 
Multivariate analyses and limitations are discussed in Section V. Concluding remarks follow in 
Section VI. 
 
 
II. Theory and Hypotheses 
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The separation of ownership and control might be a major motive to extract private benefits 
by entrenched managers. Jensen (1986) claims that entrenched managers might not act in the best 
interest of existing shareholders. They might misuse the company’s resources for empire building 
or to invest in negative NPV value projects. These agency costs might be more severe where the 
separation between the owners and management is more pronounced.  
Aslan and Kumar (2011) claim that agency-cost theories explain the decision to go private. 
Ljungqvist, et al. (2016) analyze the consequences of public to private transactions when the 
incentives to sell become misaligned. Ownership structure is a central part of their model. They 
claim that shareholders in public companies do not internalize the consequences of their decision 
to sell to the wider economy; therefore, it has negative consequences for the economy.  Renneboog, 
et al. (2007) show that shareholders in the UK receive a premium that results from firm 
undervaluation and incentive realignment. Mehran and Peristiani (2010) claim that the main reason 
for going private is due to poor financial visibility. Boot, et al. (2008) show in a theoretical model 
that firm ownership and investor participation are important determinants of a going private 
decision. Achleitner, et al. (2013) study how corporate control affects the likelihood of private 
equity acquisition for a sample of continental European firms. Political and governance factors are 
important for the going private decision. For example, Aguilera (2005) finds that corporate 
governance matters and director accountability varies, depending on the institutional setting and 
rule changes. Wright et al. (2016), for example, discuss the impact of Brexit on LBOs. 
Owners are not the same. The time horizon of owners and investors affects investment 
decisions (Thanassoulis and Somekh, 2015) and voting practices (Stathopoulos and Voulgaris, 
2016).  Connelly, et al. (2010) claim that different types of shareholders might serve as an 
influential form of company governance. They suggest that corporate owners, on one hand, 
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provide capital to the firm; yet, on the other hand, they are mostly interested in subsequently selling 
their shares in a takeover. Typically, a corporate takeover is a lucrative exit strategy for investors 
generating a high premium (Greenwood and Schor, 2009). The effect of institutional investors 
such as banks on firm corporate policies is inconclusive (Gorton and Schmid, 2000; Agarwal and 
Elston, 2001). Yuan et al. (2009) show that financial institutions play an important role in 
governance of listed companies in China.  We expect greater agency problems when the firm is 
controlled by corporate or institutional shareholders and, therefore, greater potential gains from 
public to private transactions. Furthermore, corporate or institutional investors might be more 
likely to exercise an exit opportunity and obtain a lucrative premium through a buyout.  Therefore, 
we predict that firms with a greater percentage of institutional or corporate owners are more likely 
to be targets in going private transactions. 
Corporate and institutional investors are concentrated owners and, as such, are more likely 
to be blockholders. As a blockholder, a corporate or institutional investor would have an 
exacerbated incentive to exercise a buyout for the following reasons.  Public firms have significant 
costs of disseminating information (Bharath and Dittmar, 2010).  Merton (1987) shows that under 
imperfect information expected returns to investors decrease with the size of the investor base. 
Block ownership by outside investors is associated with concentrated monitoring and private 
benefits. Blockholders can exercise their power over management. Yet, concentrated ownership 
often leads to costly overmonitoring and a decline in managerial initiative (Burkart, et al. 1997; 
Pagano and Roell, 1998). Furthermore, blockholders can often exercise their power, which leads 
to wealth expropriation from minority shareholders; these private benefits of block ownership have 
been confirmed by Barclay and Holderness (1989, 1991, 1992) through evidence that blockholder 
trades are at a premium, thus implying private benefits of control.  Blockholders may also benefit 
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through production synergies associated with cross-ownership of other companies owned and 
controlled by the blockholders, and they make better use of those synergies without the costs of 
disseminating information in the ways required when the company is public. If the block 
ownership is associated with costly overmonitoring, a decline in managerial incentives, production 
synergies, and wealth expropriation, we would expect higher buyout probability to enable value 
creation through reducing agency costs and improvements in operating efficiency.  
 
H1: Corporate and institutional ownership increase the probability of a public to private 
transaction.  
 
H2: Blockholdings of corporate and institutional ownership exacerbate the increase in the 
probability of a public to private transaction.  
 
Family firms, by contrast, have a substantially less pronounced separation of ownership 
and control. Family shareholders typically have tighter control over (or are a part of) the 
management team; as such, there is evidence that family owned firms have better performance and 
a lower cost of debt (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Anderson, et al., 2003).  Thus, companies owned 
by families are expected to have lower agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and to run more 
efficiently.6 As the potential for value creation associated with mitigating agency costs is less 
pronounced for buyouts of family firms, we expect family ownership to lower the probability of a 
public to private transaction. Ahlers et al. (2017) find that non-financial factors are particularly 
important among non-family firms in buyouts, and there is related evidence that innovation is 
valued less among family firms (Chang et al., 2010).  Furthermore, there could be emotional ties 
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associated with family ownership that reduce the likelihood of a buyout (Zellweger and Astrachan, 
2008). 
 
H3: Family ownership decreases the probability of a public to private transaction.  
 
H4: Blockholdings of family ownership exacerbate the decrease in the probability of a 
public to private transaction.  
 
 
III. Data 
A. Sample Selection  
We select a sample of worldwide public to private buyouts from the Zephyr database. We 
select all institutional and management buyouts where the public firm was a target in the buyout 
transaction and became private. We carefully check the delisting reason for each target firm and 
make sure that the delisting date is later than the buyout date. We include whole company buyouts 
and buildup strategies (i.e. where the transaction was completed in several stages). In the case of 
whole company buyouts, the entire firm is converted from a public to private company in a single 
transaction. In other words, whole company buyouts are those that are not done through a buildup 
strategy. 
We construct the main measure of ownership using data from the Orbis database. The Orbis 
ownership database is a primary source for owner links around the world for around 7 million 
companies. We decided to use Zephyr as a source of buyout transactions, as it shares common 
identifiers with Orbis, and both databases are provided by one vendor—Bureau Van Dijk.  
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All financial information is primarily from Orbis, supplemented by Thomson Reuters. All 
financial data are from the last fiscal year end before the going private transaction. Our main 
sample contains 778 public to private transactions from 2002 to 2014 from 33 countries, including 
Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Honk 
Kong, Hungary, India, Ireland, Israel Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Lithuania, Malaysia, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russian Federation, Singapore, 
South Africa, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America. 
We choose a control sample, as the distribution of buyouts is not random (Davis, et al. 
2015). For each public to private firm, we find one matched firm based on country, industry, year, 
and revenue (Weir, et al., 2005; North, 2001; Klein and Zur, 2009). We summarize the sample 
decomposition in Table 1. In Column 2, we show all public to private deals in our sample; in 
Column 3, we show whole firm buyouts (buyouts that were not done through a buildup strategy); 
in Column 4, we show buyouts through buildup strategies; and, in Columns 5 and 6, we distinguish 
between management and institutional buyouts. In Panel A, we present composition by year. There 
is a peak in buyouts in 2006-2007, reaching a number of 228 deals in 2007. In Panel B, we present 
composition by country. Buyouts through buildup strategies are common; yet, only in certain 
countries, with the majority of deals taking place in France, Germany, Italy, and the US. This might 
be related to strong shareholders’ rights and the difficulty of buying the whole company. In Panel 
C, we present composition by industry. Most of the deals occur in the services and manufacturing 
sector.  
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
  
12 
 
B. Ownership Measures 
We generate ownership measures based on the ownership data provided by Orbis. For each 
target firm going private, we extract information on its immediate shareholders. We then generate 
three types of shareholders: 1) INSTITUTION is equal to the percentage of ownership of 
institutional investors, including private equity, banks, venture capital, etc.; 2) CORPORATION 
is equal to the percentage of ownership of an industrial company; and 3) FAMILY is equal to the 
percentage of ownership of family.  
We also generate the block ownership variables. We define block ownership when one 
type of shareholder holds more than 10% of the stock. We define three types of blockholders: 1) 
INSTITUTION_BLOCK, equal to one if the ownership of institutional investors is greater than 
10%; 2) CORPORATION_BLOCK, equal to 1 if the percentage of ownership of the industrial 
company is greater than 10%; and 3) FAMILY_BLOCK, equal to one if the ownership of family 
is greater than 10%, and zero otherwise.  
 
C. Other Controls 
Although the main focus of our analysis is to analyze the relationship between ownership 
and public to private transactions, we also include other variables that are identified in the previous 
literature as determinants of buyout transactions. The theories of agency problems between the 
principal and agent of Jensen (1986) argue that firms with more free cash flow are more likely to 
be targets in buyout transactions (e.g., Halpern, Kieschnick, and Rotenberg,1999; Lehn and 
Poulsen, 1989). Financial leverage is important in many buyout transactions, as it shows the 
magnitude of the borrowing costs. Yet, it has been shown that buyout transaction can cause wealth 
expropriation from bondholders to shareholders (Asquith and Wizman, 1990). Growth 
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opportunities are also related to the free cash flow hypothesis and debt level. Firms with low 
growth prospects might misuse the cash flows and invest in negative NPV projects. On the other 
hand, firms with excessive debt levels might underinvest and forgo positive NPV projects.  
We, therefore, include the following control variables. First, we include target firm age 
(AGE), the age of the company in years. Second, we control for target firm total assets in the 
logarithm (ASSETS). Third, we include a return on assets (ROA) that proxies for profitability of 
the firm. Fourth, following Jensen (1986), we control for the misuse by entrenched managers of 
free cash flows (CASHFLOW). Fifth, we include the debt-to-asset ratio (LEVERAGE) that 
proxies for borrowing costs and wealth expropriation. Sixth, we control for the ratio of fixed assets 
to total assets (CAPINV). Finally, we include the market-to-book ratio (MB) to control for growth 
opportunities.  
 
D. Country Characteristics 
Investor protection has an important effect on firm governance (La Porta et al., 1998), we 
therefore include, as control variables, several measures that proxy for legal, institutional, and 
creditor rights. We control for creditor rights using an index developed by La Porta et al. (1998) 
and for legal origin an English legal region that is equal to 1, if a firm is incorporated in a country 
of English legal origin before going private, and zero otherwise. We also control for country 
market size using the natural log of GDP per capita of the country in which the firm is incorporated 
before going private.  
 
IV. Univariate Tests 
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In Table 2, we compare the going private sample with the control sample of matched firms 
that remained public. We first report summary statistics for the going private sample and then for 
firms that remained public. In the last two columns, we present the difference between means of 
two samples and t statistics. The statistically significant t-test suggests that going private firms are 
different in terms of ownership from firms that remained public. In particular, going private firms 
have a higher institutional and corporation ownership percentage, but a lower family ownership 
percentage.  
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
We also present our results graphically. In Figure 1, we show that the trends for different 
types of ownership are relatively stable over time. However, one can see that the average FAMILY 
ownership is higher for the non-buyout sample than for the buyout sample. In contrast, the average 
CORPORATION and INSTITUTIONAL ownership is lower for the non-buyout sample than for 
the buyout sample. This is in line with our univariate tests. We observe similar trends in Figure 2, 
where we only present whole company buyouts. Subsequently, in Figure 3, we present buyouts 
based on a buildup strategy. The plot suggests that there is only a difference in FAMILY ownership 
that is higher for the non-buyout sample than for the buyout sample. 
 
[Insert Figures 1 to 3 here] 
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Table 3 presents the correlations between variables. Institutional and corporate ownership 
are positively and significantly correlated with the going private probability. Family ownership is 
negatively and significantly correlated with the going private probability.  
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
V. Multivariate Regressions 
A. Ownership Structure 
We first examine how different shareholder types affect the probability of going private. 
We focus on three types of shareholders: institution, family, and corporation. We aggregate 
percentages of shares held by all shareholders from each of these three types. For example, 
institutional ownership is the percentage of shares held by all institutional shareholders. In Table 
4, we present the results of logit regressions. In Models 1 to 5, the dependent variable is equal to 
1, if the target firm went private after a buyout transaction, and 0 otherwise. In all models, standard 
errors are clustered by industry (Petersen, 2009). We report average marginal effects with p-values 
below.  
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
In Model 1, we present the results for the whole sample of going private transactions. The 
institutional and corporate ownership has a positive and significant effect on the probability of 
going private, consistent with H1, while the family ownership has a negative and significant effect 
on the probability of going private, consistent with H3. All three ownership variables are 
significant at the 1% level. The average marginal effect of the institutional ownership is 0.0032. 
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The interpretation is that a one percent increase in intuitional ownership would increase the 
probability of going private by 0.32%. Similarly, one percentage increase in corporation ownership 
would increase the probability of going private by 0.23%. However, a one percent increase in 
family ownership would decrease that probability by 0.23%. The results are consistent with our 
predictions.  
In Model 2, we present the results for a sample of targets that underwent a whole company 
buyout in one stage. We observe similar results. Corporate ownership has an even stronger effect. 
The probability of going private increases by 0.28% if the corporate ownership increases by 1%. 
In Model 3, we present the results for the targets that went private in a buildup strategy, 
where the acquirer bought the target firm in several stages. In the case of a buildup strategy, only 
family ownership is a strong deterrent against going private buyouts. The probability of going 
private decreases by 0.60% if the family ownership increases by 1%. The other two types of 
ownership show no significant effect. 
In Model 4, we present the results for management buyouts. The corporate ownership has 
a positive and significant effect (at the 10% level) on the probability of a management buyout.  
In Model 5, we present the results for institutional buyouts. We show that corporate and 
institutional ownership is positively associated with an institutional buyout that results in going 
private, while family ownership is negatively associated with the probability of an institutional 
buyout. Again, all three are significant, and the effect magnitudes are very close to what we 
reported for the whole sample. 
Many of the control variables are significant in Table 4.  For example, we find that the 
probability of going private is higher for younger firms with lower profitability, higher free cash 
flows, higher leverage, and less fixed assets. We also find that the credit rights index increases 
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the probability of whole company and institutional buyouts. These findings are consistent with 
Cao, Cumming, Qian, and Wang (2015), who show that LBOs are facilitated by stronger creditor 
rights. 
 
B. Ownership Block 
Instead of using aggregated ownership percentages, we look at the ownership structure by 
using a dummy variable for each of the three shareholder types. For each type, the dummy equals 
1, if the aggregate ownership is higher than 10% of the total shares. For example, an institution 
block is equal to 1, if the aggregate institution ownership in a firm is higher than 10%. This process 
allows us to compare firms closely held by a particular type of shareholders with those not held 
closely by the same type of shareholders.  
In Table 5, we present the results for the effect of block ownership on the going-private 
decision. As seen previously, in Models 1 to 5, the dependent variable is equal to 1, if the firm 
went private as a result of a buyout transaction, and 0 otherwise. In all models, standard errors are 
clustered by industry. We report average marginal effects with p-values below.  
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
Results here confirm our previous findings reported in Table 4. We show that if a firm is 
closely held by an institution or corporation, the probability of going private is higher, consistent 
with H2. However, if closely held by family, the probability of going private is lower, as expected, 
based on H4. In Model 1, for the whole sample, all three ownership variables are significant. The 
average marginal effect of the institution block is 0.1381, significant at the 1% level, and that of 
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the corporation block is 0.1061, significant at the 5% level. The family block has a negative 
marginal effect of -0.1361, significant at the 1% level. On average, a firm closely held by 
institution (corporation) shareholders is 13.81% (10.61%) more likely to go private than a firm not 
closely held by institution (corporation) shareholders. A firm closely held by family shareholders 
is 13.61% less likely to go private than a firm not closely by family shareholders. Using both the 
whole firm buyout sample and the institutional buyout sample, we see consistent results.7 
We find that block ownership is not related with the probability of going private in a 
buildup strategy. A family block is still a strong deterrent against going private in a management 
buyout, suggesting that firms with a strong family block have strong control over management.  
 
C. Endogeneity of Ownership Structure 
In this subsection, we discuss the potential endogeneity issue when analyzing the 
ownership and the decision to go private. The problem of endogeneity is quite common in 
international studies (Reeb, et al., 2012). However, while it is extremely unlikely that the going 
private decision determines the firm’s ownership structure, the firm might have some unobservable 
characteristics that might determine both ownership structure and the decision to go-private. 
Although it is difficult to completely address the endogeneity problem, we try to mitigate the 
potential bias in the three following ways. First, the carefully chosen sample design already 
corrects for the endogeneity concerns, as we match firms that go private with a similar control 
sample of firms that remain public, based on country, industry, year, and sales (Weir, et al., 2005; 
North, 2001; Klein and Zur, 2009; Davis, et al., 2015). Second, in order to further alleviate these 
concerns, we perform an additional test, where we include country x year and industry x year fixed 
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effects to capture omitted variables. Third, we instrument for the ownership structure and perform 
instrumental variable regression.  
 We test the robustness of our baseline results in Table 6. We replicate the results reported 
in Table 4 by adding country x year fixed effects in Panel A and by adding industry x year fixed 
effects in Panel B. The results reported in Table 6 with country x year and industry x year fixed 
effects support our baseline regressions.  All effects remain similar to baseline findings in Table 4 
in magnitude and statistical significance levels. 
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
In Table 7, we present instrumental variable regressions. In Model 1 to 4, we present the 
results for the whole sample of going private transactions. The instrument for 1) INSTITUTION 
is an indicator variable that is equal to one, if the institution ownership is greater than the median 
largest industry ownership, and zero otherwise; 2) FAMILY is an indicator variable that is equal 
to one, if the family ownership is greater than the median largest industry ownership, and zero 
otherwise; and 3) CORPORATION is an indicator variable that is equal to one, if the corporation 
ownership is greater than the median largest industry ownership, and zero otherwise. The median 
industry ownership is calculated for the initial year of our sample. The median industry ownership 
is correlated with the firm’s ownership structure but is unlikely to affect the buyout probability, 
except through the target’s ownership structure. The first stage of our regressions (untabulated) 
suggests that instruments are valid. In Table 7, we present second stage instrumental variables 
regressions. All effects remain similar to previous findings in magnitude and statistical 
significance levels.  
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[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
D. Additional analyses 
Antidirector rights across countries might affect going private transactions in ways 
consistent with potential wealth expropriation of minority shareholders. Delisting may be 
undesirable for minority shareholders for at least two primary reasons. First, minority shareholders 
lose liquidity; and, second, transparency decreases due to fewer disclosure requirements. This 
implies that strong antidirector rights (measured using ADRI6) would deter whole company 
buyouts, while increasing the probability of build-up buyouts, where the acquirer buys the firm in 
several stages and delists it once it has majority votes. We tested this hypothesis (results not 
tabulated) and found some evidence that stronger antidirector rights increase the likelihood of 
going private in the case of a buildup strategy, while the effect on the probability of whole company 
buyouts was negative, albeit statistically insignificant. We also interacted an ADRI_D7 variable 
with an ownership type (results not tabulated) and found that positive relationships between 
corporate ownership and buyout, and between institutional ownership and buildup type buyout, is 
mitigated when ADRI is higher than its mean. The interaction of ADRI with other ownership 
variables and for other types of buyouts did not result in statistically significant results. 
The level of corruption in a country and the degree to which the less powerful members of 
a society accept and expect power to be distributed equally might also impact buyout probabilities. 
Hence, we considered models including the Corruption Perception Index (CPI8) and the Power 
Distance Index (PDI9) as control variables (results not tabulated), and found these variables to not 
have any effect on our main results.  
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The weak effect of ADRI, CPI, and PDI may be a result of these variables having very little 
variability over the sample period for any given country. We have also tried the interaction of 
ADRI_D, CPI_D10 and PDI_D11 with the ownership variables (results not tabulated). We find that 
the positive relationship between institutional ownership [corporate ownership] and buyout 
probability is mitigated when CPI [PDI] is higher than its mean. The other interaction terms did 
not show any significant results. 
We analyzed interactions between ownership types and various proxies for cultural 
dimensions of the target country including Trust12, Individualism13, IDV14, MAS15, UAI16, 
ITOWS17, and IVR18 (results not tabulated). The interaction of corporate ownership and Trust (only 
for Management buyouts); IDV (for all buyouts, whole firm buyouts, and institutional buyouts); 
MAS (for all buyouts, whole firm buyouts, and institutional buyouts); and IVR (for all buyouts 
and institutional buyouts) has a positive coefficient, indicating that these cultural variables increase 
the probability of a buyout when there is corporate ownership. We believe that future research can 
further investigate the effect of cultural dimension. 
Finally, we tried standard industry fixed effects and country fixed effects regressions 
(without including any time fixed effects) and find that our results are unchanged to these 
alternative specifications (results not tabulated). 
 
E. Limitations and Extensions 
In this paper, we assess a link between ownership and going private.  The stability in 
different types of ownership in the period from -10 years to -1 year, prior to going private, is 
suggestive that ownership is not endogenous to going private.  Our instrumental variable analyses 
are consistent with this interpretation, and our regression analyses with country, industry, and year 
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fixed effects confirm a link between ownership and going private.  However, our sample does not 
offer a natural experiment nor a randomized test to provide further assessment of causality.  Future 
work as other samples become available in different countries over different time periods might 
shed further light on this issue. 
Also, further work could consider the performance implications of going private 
transactions for shareholders.  Our cross-country legal analyses are suggestive of conflicts of 
interest between majority and minority shareholders.  The extent of wealth expropriation and 
insider dealing, and other possible conflicts of interest, is worthy of further study. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
In this paper, we examine the ownership structure before the public to private transaction. 
Based on data from 33 countries spanning 12 years, we find strong and consistent evidence that 
pre-going private ownership is characterized by higher institutional and corporate ownership. All 
these data suggest that buyout transactions are often motivated by reducing over-monitoring, 
agency problems, and improving management efficiency. We also find that family ownership (or 
block) is a strong deterrent against a going private buyout. This supports the predictions that family 
owned firms are run more efficiently19. Management buyouts are more likely when the firm is 
owned by a corporate investor. We also find that going private through a buildup strategy is less 
likely if the firm is owned by family, while management buyouts are more likely when the firm is 
owned by a corporate investor. Overall, the data are consistent with the view that corporate and 
institutional block ownership facilitates going private, while family ownership decreases the 
probability of going private. Overall, the data are consistent with the view that corporate and 
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institutional block ownership facilitates going private, while family ownership decreases the 
probability of going private. 
Furthermore, we highlight the role of creditor rights and legal conditions. We find some 
evidence that stronger creditor rights increase the probability of going private, especially in the 
case of whole company and institutional buyouts, while the legal conditions decrease the 
likelihood of going private for those buyout types. 
Our study has some managerial implications as well. The composition of ownership is one 
of the most important factors for improving a firm’s efficiency. Going private transactions imply, 
for minority shareholders, a lack of liquidity and a lack of transparency. Consequently, some 
dispositions could be better at integrating all shareholders (minority and majority). The study also 
highlights the role of the legal system in protecting shareholders.  
Future research could examine whether the shareholders, particularly the minority 
shareholders, were treated differently depending on the ownership structure. Future research 
could also examine the real operating consequences on firms, including labor and productivity, 
conditional on the pre-going private ownership in different countries around the world. Future 
research could also study the reason why family ownership positively affects the efficiency of 
the going private transaction.   
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Figure 1. The dynamics of ownership over time (All Public to private deals) 
This figure presents the dynamics of the average percentage in ownership in the months before the buyout and non-buyout deals. 
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Figure 2. The dynamics of ownership over time (Whole firm buyout) 
This figure presents the dynamics of average percentage ownership in the months before the buyout and non-buyout deals. 
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Figure 2. The dynamics of ownership over time (Buildup strategy) 
This figure presents the dynamics of average percentage ownership in the months before the buyout and non-buyout deals. 
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Table 1. Sample 
The sample contains 778 Public to private transactions from 2002 to 2014 around the world, matched with 
778 control firms based on country, industry, year, and sales. In Column 2, we present a sample composition 
for all Public to private buyouts. In Column 3, we present a sample composition for whole company buyouts. 
In Column 4, we present the firms that went private in buildup strategies. In Columns 5 and 6 ,we present 
firms that went private through institutional buyout and management buyout, respectively. We present sample 
decomposition by year in Panel A, by target firm country in Panel B, and by target firm industry in Panel C. 
Panel A. Composition of sample by year 
Year 
All Public to 
private deals 
Whole firm 
buyout 
Buildup 
strategy 
Management 
buyout 
Institutional 
buyout 
2002 10  6 4 0 10 
2003 80 64 16 34 46 
2004 92 74 18 10 82 
2005 140 126 14 14 126 
2006 202 182 20 14 188 
2007 228 210 18 12 216 
2008 118 106 12 18 100 
2009 86 80 6 14 72 
2010 138 128 10 14 124 
2011 160 142 18 6 154 
2012 114 108 6 12 102 
2013 114 112 2 8 106 
2014 74 72 2 4 70 
Total 1556 1410 146 160 1396 
Panel B. Composition of sample by country 
Country 
All Public to 
private deals 
Whole firm 
buyout 
Buildup 
strategy 
Management 
buyout 
Institutional 
buyout 
AU(Australia) 32 (2.06%) 30 (2.13%) 2 (1.37%) 2 (1.25%) 30 (2.15%) 
BE(Belgium) 2 (0.13%) 0 (0%) 2 (1.37%) 0 (0%) 2 (0.14%) 
BG(Bulgaria) 2 (0.13%) 2 (0.14%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 2 (0.14%) 
CA(Canada) 108 (6.94%) 108 (7.66%) 0 (0%) 8 (5%) 100 (7.16%) 
CN(China) 2 (0.13%) 2 (0.14%) 0 (0%) 2 (1.25%) 0 (0%) 
DE(Germany) 34 (2.19%) 18 (1.28%) 16 (10.96%) 0 (0%) 34 (2.44%) 
DK(Denmark) 8 (0.51%) 6 (0.43%) 2 (1.37%) 0 (0%) 8 (0.57%) 
ES(Spain) 8 (0.51%) 6 (0.43%) 2 (1.37%) 0 (0%) 8 (0.57%) 
FI(Finland) 4 (0.26%) 2 (0.14%) 2 (1.37%) 0 (0%) 4 (0.29%) 
FR(France) 74 (4.76%) 30 (2.13%) 44 (30.14%) 10 (6.25%) 64 (4.58%) 
GB(UK) 212 (13.62%) 210 (14.89%) 2 (1.37%) 44 (27.5%) 168 (12.03%) 
GR(Greece) 4 (0.26%) 0 (0%) 4 (2.74%) 0 (0%) 4 (0.29%) 
HK(HongKong) 2 (0.13%) 2 (0.14%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 2 (0.14%) 
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HU(Hungary) 4 (0.26%) 2 (0.14%) 2 (1.37%) 0 (0%) 4 (0.29%) 
IE(Ireland) 4 (0.26%) 4 (0.28%) 0 (0%) 4 (2.5%) 0 (0%) 
IL(Israel) 2 (0.13%) 2 (0.14%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 2 (0.14%) 
IN(India) 2 (0.13%) 0 (0%) 2 (1.37%) 0 (0%) 2 (0.14%) 
IT(Italy) 16 (1.03%) 6 (0.43%) 10 (6.85%) 0 (0%) 16 (1.15%) 
JP(Japan) 92 (5.91%) 86 (6.1%) 6 (4.11%) 42 (26.25%) 50 (3.58%) 
KR(Korea) 2 (0.13%) 2 (0.14%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 2 (0.14%) 
LT(Lithuania) 2 (0.13%) 2 (0.14%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 2 (0.14%) 
MY(Malaysia) 10 (0.64%) 10 (0.71%) 0 (0%) 4 (2.5%) 6 (0.43%) 
NL(Netherlands) 26 (1.67%) 20 (1.42%) 6 (4.11%) 4 (2.5%) 22 (1.58%) 
NO(Norway) 18 (1.16%) 14 (0.99%) 4 (2.74%) 0 (0%) 18 (1.29%) 
NZ(New Zealand) 4 (0.26%) 2 (0.14%) 2 (1.37%) 2 (1.25%) 2 (0.14%) 
PH(Philippines) 2 (0.13%) 0 (0%) 2 (1.37%) 0 (0%) 2 (0.14%) 
PL(Poland) 12 (0.77%) 6 (0.43%) 6 (4.11%) 0 (0%) 12 (0.86%) 
PT(Portugal) 2 (0.13%) 2 (0.14%) 0 (0%) 2 (1.25%) 0 (0%) 
RU(Russia) 2 (0.13%) 0 (0%) 2 (1.37%) 0 (0%) 2 (0.14%) 
SE(Sweden) 18 (1.16%) 16 (1.13%) 2 (1.37%) 0 (0%) 18 (1.29%) 
SG(Singapore) 26 (1.67%) 24 (1.7%) 2 (1.37%) 2 (1.25%) 24 (1.72%) 
US(USA) 808 (51.93%) 784 (55.6%) 24 (16.44%) 34 (21.25%) 774 (55.44%) 
ZA(South Africa) 12 (0.77%) 12 (0.85%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 12 (0.86%) 
Total 1556 (100%) 1410 (100%) 146 (100%) 160 (100%) 1396 (100%) 
Panel C. Composition of sample by industry 
Industry 
All Public to 
private deals 
Whole firm 
buyout 
Buildup 
strategy 
Management 
buyout 
Institutional 
buyout 
Agriculture 2 2 0 0 2 
Construction 18 16 2 2 16 
Finance, Insurance 256 234 22 34 222 
Manufacturing 404 352 52 42 362 
Mining 28 26 2 2 26 
Retail Trade 172 166 6 20 152 
Services 490 448 42 36 454 
Transportation 110 102 8 10 100 
Wholesale Trade 76 64 12 14 62 
Total 1556 1410 146 160 1396 
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Table 2. Univariate tests 
 Going private Firms Control Sample T-test for the Difference 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
Diff in 
means t-stat 
Ownership variables         
INSTITUTION 778 19.4568 28.4473 778 11.9972 19.6090 -7.4596 -6.0221 
FAMILY 778 3.4818 11.9795 778 5.3788 16.2718 1.8970 2.618658 
CORPORATION 778 8.2785 23.1485 778 5.0733 16.1034 -3.2052 -3.17043 
INSTITUTION_BLOCK 778 0.4370 0.4963 778 0.3111 0.4632 -0.1260 -5.17513 
FAMILY_BLOCK 778 0.0835 0.2769 778 0.1272 0.3335 0.0437 2.812323 
CORPORATION_BLOCK 778 0.1401 0.3473 778 0.1003 0.3005 -0.0398 -2.41981 
         
Other variables         
AGE 778 24.0180 23.8733 778 26.7686 29.7786 2.7506 2.010198 
ASSETS 778 5.4495 1.6659 778 5.4515 1.9316 0.0021 0.022584 
ROA 778 0.1024 0.1866 778 0.1354 0.4493 0.0330 1.894442 
CASHFLOW 778 -0.0044 0.1925 778 0.0216 0.3896 0.0260 1.66746 
LEVERAGE 778 0.2622 0.3204 778 0.2339 0.4726 -0.0283 -1.38129 
CAPINV 778 0.4938 0.4418 778 0.4340 0.7685 -0.0598 -1.88063 
MB 778 7.7057 37.4491 778 5.8751 34.5855 -1.8306 -1.00165 
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Table 3. Correlations 
  Buyout Institution Family Corporation 
Institution 
Block 
Family 
Block 
Corporati
on Block AGE ASSETS ROA 
CASH-
FLOW 
LEVE-
RAGE CAPINV MB 
BUYOUT 1.0000 
             
INSTITUTION 0.1510* 1.0000 
            
FAMILY -0.0663* -0.0681* 1.0000 
           
CORPORATION 0.0802* -0.0957* -0.0185 1.0000 
          
INSTITUTION 
BLOCK 
 
0.1302* 0.7089* -0.0380 -0.1306* 1.0000 
         
FAMILY BLOCK -0.0712* -0.0561* 0.8087* -0.0154 -0.0101 1.0000 
        
CORPORATION 
BLOCK 
 
0.0613* -0.0512* 0.0185 0.8119* -0.0856* 0.0276 1.0000 
       
AGE -0.0509* -0.0641* -0.0677* 0.0250 -0.0769* -0.0651* 0.0259 1.0000 
      
ASSETS -0.0006 0.0314 -0.2177* -0.0695* 0.0460 -0.2317* -0.0542* 0.1469* 1.0000 
     
ROA -0.0480 -0.0258 0.1524* -0.0032 -0.0360 0.1195* -0.0060 -0.0616* -0.3510* 1.0000 
    
CASHFLOW -0.0423 -0.0138 0.1414* -0.0132 -0.0152 0.0986* -0.0148 -0.0301 -0.2733* 0.9395* 1.0000 
   
LEVERAGE 0.0350 0.0486 0.1358* 0.0243 0.0052 0.0882* 0.0331 -0.0510* -0.0039 0.5008* 0.4777* 1.0000 
  
CAPINV 0.0477 0.0012 0.0974* 0.0449 -0.0104 0.0522* 0.0502* 0.0417 -0.0685* 0.1131* 0.0489 0.1048* 1.0000 
 
MB 0.0254 -0.0149 0.1156* 0.0261 0.0003 0.0908* 0.0081 -0.0333 -0.1231* 0.1048* 0.0891* 0.0393 0.3163* 1.0000 
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Table 4. Ownership structure and going-private decision 
This table presents logit regressions. The dependent variable in each regression is an indicator variable equal to 
one, if the firm goes private, and zero otherwise. The sample includes firms from 2002 to 2014. In Model 1, we 
present the results for the whole sample of going-private transactions. In Model 2, we present the results for a 
sample of targets that underwent a buyout of the whole company in one stage. In Model 3, we present the results 
for the targets that were acquired in a buildup strategy where the acquirer bought the target firm in several stages. 
In Model 4, we present the results for management buyouts. In Model 5, we present the results for institutional 
buyouts. All models include constant, industry and year fixed effects. Robust errors are clustered at industry 
level. We report the marginal effects with p-value in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% 
significance levels. See Appendix 1 for variable definitions. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
All Public to 
private deals 
Whole firm 
buyout 
Buildup 
strategy 
Management 
buyout 
Institutional 
buyout 
Ownership      
INSTITUTION 0.0032*** 0.0033*** 0.0033 0.0001 0.0034*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.3963) (0.9839) (0.0000) 
FAMILY -0.0023*** -0.0018* -0.0060* -0.0011 -0.0024*** 
 (0.0019) (0.0574) (0.0646) (0.7378) (0.0056) 
CORPORATION 0.0023*** 0.0028*** -0.0011 0.0059** 0.0021*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.6385) (0.0113) (0.0001) 
Controls      
AGE -0.0010* -0.0009* -0.0019* -0.0006 -0.0012* 
 (0.0649) (0.0864) (0.0790) (0.6267) (0.0545) 
ASSETS -0.0113* -0.0107 -0.0334 -0.0022 -0.0095 
 (0.0745) (0.1173) (0.2229) (0.9443) (0.1942) 
ROA -0.2970*** -0.2682*** -0.5571 -0.1835 -0.3370*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.3857) (0.5634) (0.0045) 
CASHFLOW 0.1420*** 0.1061* 0.4132 0.1133 0.1868*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0667) (0.2993) (0.7922) (0.0004) 
LEVERAGE 0.1011** 0.1054 0.0666 0.0586 0.1009 
 (0.0368) (0.1086) (0.4035) (0.4711) (0.1050) 
CAPINV 0.0487 0.0411 0.1289 0.2558** 0.0555* 
 (0.2027) (0.2245) (0.4918) (0.0286) (0.0770) 
MB 0.0003 0.0003 -0.0022 0.0038*** -0.0002 
 (0.5755) (0.5213) (0.6786) (0.0034) (0.6594) 
GDPCAPITA 0.0079 0.0146 0.0106 0.0682 0.0025 
 (0.5036) (0.5652) (0.7895) (0.2888) (0.8568) 
CREDITOR_INDEX 0.0056 0.0075* 0.0076 0.0053 0.0055 
 (0.1242) (0.0610) (0.6272) (0.6746) (0.2262) 
LEGAL_UK -0.0148* -0.0051 -0.0645** 0.0469 -0.0162* 
 (0.0684) (0.6618) (0.0470) (0.2452) (0.0546) 
      
      
N 1556 1410 146 160 1396 
PSEUDO R-SQ 0.0362 0.0379 0.0664 0.0690 0.0395 
LOG LIK. -1039.4481 -940.3442 -94.4810 -103.2515 -929.3679 
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Table 5. Block ownership and going-private decision 
This table presents logit regressions. The dependent variable in each regression is an indicator variable equal to 
one, if the firm goes private, and zero otherwise. The sample includes firms from 2002 to 2014. In Model 1, we 
present the results for the whole sample of going-private transactions. In Model 2, we present the results for a 
sample of targets that underwent a buyout of the whole company in one stage. In Model 3, we present the results 
for the targets that were acquired in a buildup strategy where the acquirer bought the target firm in several stages. 
In Model 4, we present the results for management buyouts. In Model 5, we present the results for institutional 
buyouts. All models include constant, industry and year fixed effects. Robust errors are clustered at industry 
level. We report the marginal effects with p-value in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% 
significance levels. See Appendix 1 for variable definitions. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
All Public to 
private deals 
Whole firm 
buyout 
Buildup 
strategy 
Management 
buyout 
Institutional 
buyout 
Ownership      
INSTITUTION 
BLOCK 
0.1381*** 
(0.0001) 
0.1355*** 
(0.0001) 
0.2312 
(0.1696) 
0.0260 
(0.7923) 
0.1466*** 
(0.0005) 
      
FAMILY BLOCK -0.1361*** -0.1256*** -0.2531 -0.1818* -0.1353*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0035) (0.1783) (0.0801) (0.0000) 
CORPORATION 
BLOCK 
0.1061** 
(0.0107) 
0.1301*** 
(0.0011) 
-0.0512 
(0.7921) 
0.2304* 
(0.0512) 
0.0965** 
(0.0484)       
Controls      
AGE -0.0010* -0.0009* -0.0025** -0.0004 -0.0012** 
 (0.0551) (0.0772) (0.0207) (0.7101) (0.0479) 
ASSETS -0.0137** -0.0140** -0.0233 -0.0175 -0.0113* 
 (0.0163) (0.0232) (0.2582) (0.5748) (0.0641) 
ROA -0.2891*** -0.2634*** -0.5521 -0.2638 -0.3181*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.4228) (0.4351) (0.0007) 
CASHFLOW 0.1232*** 0.0866 0.4559 0.1392 0.1584*** 
 (0.0000) (0.1548) (0.2676) (0.7768) (0.0001) 
LEVERAGE 0.1148** 0.1233* 0.0324 0.0515 0.1161* 
 (0.0139) (0.0547) (0.7146) (0.4935) (0.0514) 
CAPINV 0.0482 0.0418 0.1457 0.2461* 0.0542* 
 (0.2190) (0.2253) (0.4508) (0.0529) (0.0815) 
MB 0.0002 0.0003 -0.0040 0.0039*** -0.0002 
 (0.5733) (0.4819) (0.3694) (0.0038) (0.6702) 
GDPCAPITA 0.0035 0.0115 -0.0013 0.1027 -0.0042 
 (0.7035) (0.5214) (0.9740) (0.1343) (0.7083) 
CREDITOR_INDEX 0.0066** 0.0076* 0.0090 0.0020 0.0067* 
 (0.0265) (0.0614) (0.4020) (0.8923) (0.0625) 
LEGAL_UK -0.0214* -0.0124 -0.0733 0.0332 -0.0256* 
 (0.0645) (0.3071) (0.1540) (0.2933) (0.0603)       
      
N 1556 1410 146 160 1396 
PSEUDO R-SQ 0.0311 0.0315 0.0703 0.0666 0.0330 
LOG LIK. -1044.9606 -946.5941 -94.0864 -103.5184 -935.7423 
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Table 6. Robustness: Country x year and  industry x year fixed effects 
This table presents logit regressions. The dependent variable in each regression is an indicator variable equal to 
one, if the firm goes private, and zero otherwise. The sample includes firms from 2002 to 2014. In Model 1, we 
present the results for the whole sample of going-private transactions. In Model 2, we present the results for a 
sample of targets that underwent a buyout of the whole company in one stage. In Model 3, we present the results 
for the targets that were acquired in a buildup strategy where the acquirer bought the target firm in several stages. 
In Model 4, we present the results for management buyouts. In Model 5, we present the results for institutional 
buyouts. All models include constant, controls, industry and year fixed effects. Robust errors are clustered at 
industry level. We report the marginal effects with p-value in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 
10% significance levels. See Appendix 1 for variable definitions. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
All Public to 
private deals 
Whole firm 
buyout 
Buildup 
strategy 
Management 
buyout 
Institutional 
buyout 
Panel A. Country x year fixed effects 
Ownership      
Institution 0.0037*** 0.0038*** 0.0040 -0.0009 0.0039*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.5181) (0.7926) (0.0000) 
Family -0.0025*** -0.0019* -0.0090* -0.0015 -0.0026*** 
 (0.0020) (0.0575) (0.0643) (0.6833) (0.0076) 
Corporation 0.0029*** 0.0036*** -0.0017 0.0122* 0.0027*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.6102) (0.0551) (0.0000) 
            
N 1556 1410 146 160 1396 
PSEUDO R-SQ 0.0419 0.0438 0.0910 0.1182 0.0455 
LOG LIK. 1033.3853 -934.5384 -91.9922 -97.7920 -923.5916 
Panel B. Industry x year fixed effects 
Ownership      
Institution 0.0034*** 0.0035*** 0.0048 -0.0002 0.0037*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.2987) (0.9485) (0.0000) 
Family -0.0025*** -0.0018* -0.0076** -0.0021 -0.0025*** 
 (0.0022) (0.0742) (0.0342) (0.5857) (0.0080) 
Corporation 0.0023*** 0.0029*** -0.0011 0.0090*** 0.0021*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.7180) (0.0081) (0.0001) 
            
N 1556 1410 146 160 1396 
PSEUDO R-SQ 0.0382 0.0399 0.0844 0.0874 0.0423 
LOG LIK. 1037.3032 -938.3024 -92.6621 -101.2137 -926.6817 
 
  
  
39 
 
Table 7. Robustness: Instrumental Variable (IV) estimation 
This table presents instrumental variable regressions. The dependent variable in each regression is 
an indicator variable equal to one, if the firm goes private, and zero otherwise. The sample includes 
firms from 2002 to 2014. In Models 1 to 4,we present the results for the whole sample of going-
private transactions. The instrument for 1) INSTITUTION is an indicator variable that equals to 
one, if the institution ownership is greater than the median largest industry ownership, and zero 
otherwise; 2) FAMILY is an indicator variable that equals to one, if the family ownership is greater 
than the median largest industry ownership, and zero otherwise; and 3) CORPORATION is an 
indicator variable that equals to one, if the corporation ownership is greater than the median largest 
industry ownership, and zero otherwise. All models include constant, controls, industry, and year 
fixed effects. Robust errors are clustered at industry level. We report the marginal effects with p-
value in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels. See Appendix 
1 for variable definitions. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ownership     
INSTITUTION 0.0030***   0.0030*** 
 (0.0000)   (0.0000) 
FAMILY  -0.0025***  -0.0020** 
  (0.0053)  (0.0458) 
CORPORATION   0.0015** 0.0017*** 
   (0.0291) (0.0061) 
Controls     
AGE -0.0010* -0.0012** -0.0011** -0.0010* 
 (0.0988) (0.0241) (0.0361) (0.0678) 
ASSETS -0.0084 -0.0131*** -0.0080 -0.0108** 
 (0.1534) (0.0069) (0.1584) (0.0257) 
ROA -0.2940*** -0.3329*** -0.3221*** -0.2958*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
CASHFLOW 0.1367*** 0.1662*** 0.1540*** 0.1429*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
LEVERAGE 0.1024** 0.1210** 0.1105** 0.1031** 
 (0.0412) (0.0110) (0.0154) (0.0328) 
CAPINV 0.0508 0.0529 0.0491 0.0495 
 (0.2844) (0.2159) (0.2681) (0.2279) 
MB 0.0002 0.0003 0.0002 0.0003 
 (0.6258) (0.5223) (0.7101) (0.5566) 
GDPCAPITA -0.0055 -0.0034 0.0060 0.0051 
 (0.3307) (0.4570) (0.3493) (0.6000) 
CREDITOR_INDEX 0.0068** 0.0016 0.0033 0.0056 
 (0.0409) (0.4542) (0.1006) (0.1503) 
LEGAL_UK -0.0252*** -0.0138 -0.0066 -0.0173 
 (0.0076) (0.2409) (0.6241) (0.1386)      
     
N 1556 1556 1556 1556 
PSEUDO R-SQ 0.0207 0.0133 0.0131 0.0250 
LOG LIK. -1056.1931 -1064.2134 -1064.4382 -1051.5761 
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Appendix 1. Variables definitions 
Variable Name Definition  
 
Dependent Variable 
 
INSTITUTIONAL BUYOUT 
 
An indicator variable equal to one, if the institution ownership is greater than the 
median largest industry ownership, and zero otherwise; “This is an acquisition 
where a Private Equity firm has taken a 50% stake or more in the Target company, 
or is the parent of the acquirer. The acquisition often takes place through a ‘new 
company’ (newco) or an acquisition vehicle. Often the target company’s 
management will take a small stake. If the buy-out is for less than 100 per cent of 
the target company, the deal is coded as IBO X%. Many deals described in the 
media as MBOs are coded on Zephyr as IBOs due to the fact that the management 
team did NOT take a majority stake in the target. There are very few occasions 
when venture capital may be inserted instead of private equity as the financing 
method. This would only occur when an early-stage company raises development 
capital funding, and the investors achieve a majority stake.” [Zephyr Definition] 
MANAGEMENT BUYOUT An indicator variable equal to one, [????]. “All or some of the existing 
management of the company buys at least 50% of the company from its existing 
owners. A private equity company is often brought in to aid the purchase through 
provision of equity funding. A ‘new company’ (newco) is normally formed by 
the management team specifically to purchase the target. The acquirer company 
would also show ‘MBO Team’ unless the name of the newco is known. If the 
name of the newco has been released, this company would be entered as the 
acquirer. If the Private Equity firm backing the deal takes a majority stake in the 
target, the deal is not defined as an MBO and would be coded as an IBO.” 
WHOLE COMPANY BUYOUT An indicator variable equal to one, if in the public-to-private buyout transaction 
acquirer has taken a 100% stake in the target company, and zero otherwise 
BUILDUP BUYOUT  An indicator variable equal to one, if the public-to-private buyout transaction was 
completed in several stages, and zero otherwise 
  
Ownership  
INSTITUTION The percentage ownership of private equity or bank  
FAMILY The percentage ownership of family  
CORPORATION The percentage ownership of industrial company  
INSTITUTION_BLOCK An indicator variable equal to one, if ownership of private equity or bank is 
greater than 10%, and zero otherwise  
FAMILY_BLOCK An indicator variable equal to one, if ownership of family is greater than 10%, 
and zero otherwise  
CORPORATION_BLOCK An indicator variable equal to one, if percentage ownership of industrial company 
is greater than 10%, and zero otherwise  
 
Controls 
 
AGE The natural logarithm of the company age in years  
ASSETS  The natural logarithm of total assets  
ROA Return on assets  
CASHFLOW Operating income minus capital investment minus change in net working capital 
scaled by total assets  
LEVERAGE The ratio of total debt to total assets  
CAPINV The ratio of fixed assets to total assets  
MB The firm’s market-to-book  
GDPCAPITA Gross national income per capita [World Development Indicators] 
LEGAL_UK 
 
An indicator variable equal to one, if the firm is incorporated in a country of 
English legal origin before going private, and zero otherwise [La Porta et al. 
(1998)] 
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CREDITOR_INDEX 
 
Creditor rights index from La Porta et al. (1998).  A score of one is assigned when 
each of the following rights of secured lenders are defined in laws and 
regulations: First, there are restrictions, such as creditor consent or minimum 
dividends, for a debtor to file for reorganization. Second, secured creditors are 
able to seize their collateral after the reorganization petition is approved, i.e., 
there is no automatic stay or asset freeze. Third, secured creditors are paid first 
out of the proceeds of liquidating a bankrupt firm, as opposed to other creditors 
such as government or workers. Finally, if management does not retain 
administration of its property pending the resolution of the reorganization. The 
index ranges from 0 (weak creditor rights) to 4 (strong creditor rights) and is 
constructed as at January for every year from 1978 to 2003. [La Porta (1998)] 
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NOTES 
1 Not all buyouts are going private transactions, and likewise, not all buyouts or going private transactions involve 
private equity sponsors. In this paper, we use the term ‘buyout’ to refer to public to private buyout transactions only, 
and consider both private-equity and non-private equity sponsored buyouts. 
2  Ben Stein, “On Buyouts, There Ought to Be a Law” The New York Times (September 3, 2006), at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/03/business/yourmoney/03every.html?ex=1314936000&en=6679077c5af5c4a6&
ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss 
3 “The uneasy crown,” The Economist (February 8, 2007) http://www.economist.com/node/8663441 
4 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Locust_(finance) 
5 For example, in a recent legal dispute involving Protective Products of America (PPA), PPA allegedly did not 
disclose material information about a $300 million contract award and was subsequently delisted and then put into 
bankruptcy.  In bankruptcy, PPA was sold to a new company created by many of the prior managers of PPA.  With 
the help of a PE fund, the new company bought PPA’s assets in bankruptcy for roughly $10 million.  Shortly thereafter, 
the managers of new announced the $300 million contract award. 
6 The Antidirector Rights Index (ADRI) is formed by adding one when: (1) the country allows shareholders to mail 
their proxy vote, (2) shareholders are not required to deposit their shares prior to the General Shareholders’ Meeting, 
(3) cumulative voting or proportional representation of minorities on the board of directors is allowed, (4) an oppressed 
minorities mechanism is in place, (5) the minimum percentage of share capital that entitles a shareholder to call for an 
extraordinary Shareholders’ Meeting is less than or equal to 10 percent the sample median, or (6) when shareholders 
have pre-emptive rights that can only be waived by a shareholders meeting. 
7 ADRI_D is a dummy variable that is equal to one, if the ADRI is higher than the mean of ADRI, and zero otherwise. 
8 The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) scores and ranks countries/territories based on how corrupt a country’s 
public sector is perceived to be [Transparency International] 
9 The Power Distance Index (PDI) measures the degree to which the less powerful members of a society accept and 
expect that power is distributed unequally [http://geert-hofstede.com/] 
10 CPI_D is a dummy variable that is equal to one, if the CPI is higher than the mean of CPI, and zero otherwise. 
11 PDI_D is a dummy variable that is equal to one, if the PDI is higher than the mean of PDI, and zero otherwise. 
12 Trust is a dummy variable equal to one, if the trust is higher than the mean, and zero otherwise. Trust is an average 
answer to the following question: “Generally speaking, would you say that (1) “Most people can be trusted.” Or, (2) 
“Most people need to be very careful.” 
13 Individualism is a dummy variable equal to one, if the individualism is higher than the mean, and zero otherwise. 
Individualism is an average answer to the following question: “Incomes should be more equal.” Or, “We need larger 
income differences as incentives for individual effort.” 
14 IDV is a dummy variable equal to one, if the IDV is higher than the mean, and zero otherwise. IDV is the 
Individualism versus Collectivism of the respective target country (see http://geerthofstede.com/national-culture.html). 
15 MAS is a dummy variable equal to one, if the MAS is higher than the mean, and zero otherwise. MAS is the 
Masculinity versus Femininity of the respective target country (see http://geerthofstede.com/national-culture.html). 
16 UAI is a dummy variable equal to one, if the UAI is higher than the mean, and zero otherwise. UAI is the Uncertainty 
Avoidance Index of the respective country target country (see http://geerthofstede.com/national-culture.html).  
17 ITOWS is a dummy variable equal to one, if the ITOWS is higher than the mean, and zero otherwise. ITOWS is 
Long -Term Orientation versus Short-Term Normative Orientation of the respective target country (see http://geert-
hofstede.com/nationalculture.html). 
18 IVR is a dummy variable equal to one, if the IVR is higher than the mean, and zero otherwise. IVR is the Indulgence 
versus Restraint of the respective target country (see http://geert-hofstede.com/nationalculture.html). 
19 Westhead and Cowling (1997) study the performance between family and non-family unquoted companies in the 
UK. They find that family companies are more interested in non-financial objectives than non-family companies. 
Daily and Dollinger (1992) and Neubauer and Lank (1998) find that family firms have superior performance to non-
family firms. Ganderrio (1999) found that family firms have a higher level of ROE and are financially stronger than 
non-family firms. Anderson and Reeb (2002) show that family ownership is prevalent and substantially more 
profitable and more valuable than non-family ownership. 
20 In untabulated analysis, we checked whether our results are robust to the definition of the block ownership of 5% 
and 20%. The results remain unchanged.  
                                                          
